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In Australian Aboriginal affairs, the acculturative strand of assimilation developed in large part
from Elkin’s religious and Idealist commitment, for which he won social-scientific authority. In
competition with both an eliminationist politics of race and a segregationist politics of territory,
Elkin drew upon religious experience, apologetics, sociology, and networks to establish a
‘positive policy’ as an enduring ideal in Aboriginal affairs. His leadership of the 1930s reform
movement began within the Anglican Church, became national through civic-religious organs of
publicity, and gained scientific authority as Elkin made religious themes a central concern in
Australian anthropology. But from the 1960s until recently, most scholars have lost sight of the
centrality of Idealism and religion in our protagonist’s seminal project of acculturative
assimilation.  This thesis aims to show how Elkin dealt with problems fundamental to twentieth
century Aboriginal affairs and indeed to Australian modernity more generally – problems of faith
and science, morality and expediency – in developing his ‘positive policy’ towards Aborigines.
Recent scholarship has shown that A. P. Elkin (1891-1979) was a leading Australian theorist and
publicist of acculturative assimilation for Indigenous people.1 That is, Elkin advocated that
governments, missions, and employers should assist Aborigines to adapt their societies ‘from
within’ to settler Australian society, in the hope that corporate Aboriginal continuity would
sustain prosocial change.2 Such change is designated ‘acculturative’ to distinguish it from
‘enculturative’ assimilation, whereby a minority assimilates by taking on the majority’s norms as
a replacement for, and not with reference to, their own culture.3  It is important to note from the
outset that Elkin never envisioned an exclusively acculturative national policy.  He developed
and advocated policy that was ‘positive and developmental, rather than negative and protective’.4
                                                
1 Russell McGregor, ‘Assimilation as Acculturation: AP Elkin on the Dynamics of Cultural Change’, in Tim Rowse
(ed.), Contesting Assimilation (Perth: API Network, 2005), 169-183.
2 I will use the terms ‘settler society’ and ‘settler Australians’ as a synonym for ‘non-Indigenous society /
Australians’. The former reflects the shift from subsistence to industrial economies, and foregrounds the attitude
prevalent within the European Australian political elite that their possession of the continent needed to be made good
through both wider and closer settlement (Chs. 1, 5).  In this context (of sovereignty as a project), I trust that it makes
sense to speak of government officials and missionaries, as well as pastoralists for example, as ‘settlers’. (Not
inappropriately, in the 1930s some Aborigines were also settlers in this sense: see Russell McGregor, ‘Develop the
North: Aborigines, Environment and Australian Nationhood in the 1930s’, Journal of Australian Studies, March
2004, 33–45.
3 McGregor, ‘Assimilation as Acculturation’, 170.
4 A. P. Elkin, ‘A Policy for the Aborigines’, Morpeth Review III (25), October 1933, 29–35 [Address presented to
APNR Annual Meeting 21 April 1932], 32.
Anchorage in Aboriginal Affairs:
A.P. Elkin on religious continuity and civic obligation
2
Wherever possible, Aboriginal societies should be assisted to adapt to new situations such that
cultural continuity made the new ways durable.
Scholars have shown that, in Australian history, ‘assimilation’ is best conceived as a
contested and ongoing policy movement.5 In the 1930s, in pursuing his acculturative agenda,
Elkin also argued that enculturative measures would be necessary to support some Aboriginal
communities in transitional phases. In the 1950s, the Commonwealth Minister for Territories,
Paul Hasluck, led an exclusively enculturative national policy.6 In the 1960s, the sidelined
movement for acculturative assimilation gathered momentum under the label ‘integration’ and,
from the 1970s, became the official policy of ‘self-determination’. In this broad conception of the
assimilation policy, Elkin stands out as the foundational thinker in twentieth century Aboriginal
affairs.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the sociologist C. D. Rowley (1906-1985), in what remains
the single most important history of Australian affairs, favourably assessed Elkin’s policy.7
Rowley acknowledged that Elkin had been the first to respond coherently and comprehensively to
the policy challenges associated with Australian settler colonialism.
However, Rowley’s development of Elkin’s lead was more reduction than renovation.
Rowlery argued that the anthropologist’s emphasis on cultural difference ought to give way to a
focus upon political concerns, such as group solidarity and the dynamics of corporate self-
determination, which settlers and Aborigines had in common.8 He envisioned Aboriginal
corporations as legal entities providing the ‘protective carapace’ that villages afforded more
sedentary colonised peoples, such as Melanesians.9 As we will see, Elkin, in contrast, had built a
policy framework from religious fundamentals, through cultural differences and group identities,
to strategies associated with political self-determination. From about 1960, legacies of Elkin’s era
                                                
5 Tim Rowse, ‘Introduction’ in Contesting Assimilation, 1–24; Tim Rowse, ‘The Post-War Social Science of
Assimilation 1947–1966’ in ibid, 151-168; and Robert van Krieken, ‘Assimilation and Liberal Government’, in ibid,
39-47. For an example of the monolithic and reductive view of assimilation against which Rowse and McGregor
argue, see, for example, Anna Haebich, ‘Imagining Assimilation’, Australian Historical Studies 118, 2002, 61–70.
6 Cora Thomas, ‘From “Australian Aborigines” to “white Australians”’, Australian Aboriginal Studies (1) 2001,
21–35, passim and especially at 26, 31.
7 Ramola Yardi and Geoffrey Stokes, ‘Foundations for Reconciliation in Social Science: The Political Thought of
CD Rowley’, Melbourne Journal of Politics (25), 1998, 45–63.
8 CD Rowley, The Destruction of Aboriginal Society: Aboriginal Policy and Practice Volume 1 (Canberra:
Australian National University Press, 1970), 47, 298–299, 329–330; idem, Outcasts in White Australia: Aboriginal
Policy and Practice—Volume III (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1971), 36, 73–77, 383–388.
9 Idem, The Remote Aborigines: Aboriginal Policy and Practice—Volume III (Canberra: Australian National
University Press, 1971), 11. See also Ramola Yardi and Geoffrey Stokes, ‘Political Thought of CD Rowley’, 45–63.
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such as acculturative Christian mission became dissociated from policy debates, as Rowley’s
political emphasis gained ground.
From the 1980s, leading historians of Aboriginal affairs ignored Rowley’s estimation of
Elkin’s formative contribution in the 1930s. Elkin’s pre-eminent influence upon Aboriginal
policy reform from 1934 to 1939 had been well reported, primarily by himself.10 Perhaps in
reaction against Elkin’s self-promotion and in response to his defensive posture as professor of
anthropology in the 1950s and 1960s, these more recent historians characterised Elkin as
paternalist, racialist, concerned mainly with the triumph of settler Australian values, and
insensitive to Aboriginal interests especially in land.11 While the last of these criticisms has some
merit, following chapters will challenge the others.
In general, settler Australians who contributed to policy debates concerning Aborigines
between the wars were preoccupied with Aborigines’ prospects for survival as a race.12 In the
racial categories of the time, people born of only one full blood Aboriginal parent were not
Aboriginal, but half-caste.13 According to this view, the sparse populations of Aborigines had to
be separated from other races, or lose their distinctive existence, or even ‘disappear’. This
viewpoint was corroborated by social anthropologists who analysed the structure of Aborigines’
societies, and concluded that these societies could not survive the usurpation of their territory by
Europeans.14 In the 1930s and 1940s, humanitarians who read these social anthropologists’
articles recommended that Aborigines who had not yet intermingled with Europeans be
                                                
10 See, for example, AP Elkin, Citizenship for the Aborigine: A National Aboriginal Policy (Sydney: Australasian
Publishing Co., 1944); AP Elkin, ‘Anthropology in Autralia: One Chapter’, Mankind (5), 225–242; and AP Elkin,
‘The Aboriginal Policy 1930–50: Some Personal Associations’, Quadrant I (4) 1957, 27 – 34, at 29–30.
11 Tigger Wise, Elkin’s biographer, argued that Elkin became defensive in the 1940s and increasingly self-regarding
thereafter. See her The Self-Made Anthropologist: A Life of AP Elkin (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1985). For
critiques of Elkin, see Peter Read, ‘A double headed coin: Protection and assimilation in Yass 1900–1960’, in Bill
Gammage and Andrew Markus (eds), All That Dirt: Aborigines 1938 (Canberra: History Project Incorporated
(ANU),1982), 9–28; DJ Mulvaney, ‘Australasian Anthropology and ANZAAS: “Strictly Scientific and Critical”, in
Roy Macleod (ed.), The Commonwealth of Science: ANZAAS and the Scientific Enterprise on Australasia
1888–1988 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988), 208–216, esp. at 216; Geoffrey Gray, ‘From Nomadism to
Citizenship’, in Nicolas Peterson and Will Sanders (eds.) Citizenship And Indigenous Australians: Changing
Conceptions And Possibilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 55–69; Gillian Cowlishaw,
Rednecks, Eggheads and Blackfellas: A Study of Racial Power and Intimacy in Australia (Sydney: Allen & Unwin,
1999); and Bain Attwood, Rights for Aborigines (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003), 103–104.
12 Russell McGregor, Imagined Destinies: Aboriginal Australians and the Doomed Race Theory, 1889–1939
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1997).
13 I have chosen to omit quotation marks around outdated and sometimes offensive terminology because most of this
thesis is a reconstruction and analysis of the thinking that found expression in such terms. In drawing attention to
some causes of the decline of the racialist paradigm of the 1930s, I do not endorse that paradigm.
14 See Ch. 9. Also Attwood, Rights for Aborigines, 103–30.
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segregated on what remained of tribal lands, in the desert or the tropics. Thus, both racial and
social analyses led to the idea that settler Australians ought to segregate Aborigines so that the
race (and society) could persist.
In the 1920s and 1930s, physical anthropologists and the states and territories’ ‘Chief
Protectors’ of Aborigines, who also began from racialist premises, had drawn a complementary
conclusion concerning the future for communities and individuals of mixed race. They argued
that settler Australians should encourage the ‘absorption’ into the white majority of Aborigines
who could not be segregated on traditional tribal land. That way, the increasing proportion of
part-Aboriginal families would increase their opportunities in settler Australian society by
mitigating their alleged racial disadvantages, rapidly assimilating to settler norms, and, more
generally, ceasing to be associated with a disparaged minority group. Influential proponents of
the absorption of Aborigines, including the Chief Protectors in the Northern Territory and West
Australian administrations, envisioned the (‘inevitable’) end of the Aboriginal race.15
Missionaries were fundamentally opposed to racialist thinking, but most believed their
duty was to replace traditional Aboriginal culture with a version of Christianity. A minority who
respected Aboriginal culture despaired of its chances of surviving the cataclysm of European
settlement. On balance, Christian mission was overwhelmingly an agent for enculturation, that is,
the elimination of Aboriginal culture in order to remove an obstacle on their (Christian) road into
settler Australian society.16
Thus, Aboriginal affairs in 1930 was characterised by three typical policy positions:
segregation, biological absorption, and cultural elimination. We can reduce these positions to
two, which were sometimes proposed in combination: the elimination (whether by cultural or
biological means) and segregation of Aborigines.17 These ‘imagined destinies’ shared the premise
                                                
15 See Ch. 5; also Paul Hasluck, Our Southern Half-Castes, a series of articles reprinted from the West Australian
(1936), AO Neville, Australia’s Coloured Minority: Its Place in the Community (Sydney: Currawong Publishing,
1948); Warwick Anderson, Cultivating Whiteness: Science, Health and Racial Destiny in Australia (Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press, 2002), 235–39. On the protectors, see Robert Manne, ‘Aboriginal Child Removal and
the Question of Genocide, 1900–1940, in  A. Dirk Moses (ed.), Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and
Stolen Children in Australian History (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 217–243.
16 See Ch. 6; also Rowley, Destruction of Aboriginal Society, Ch. 14.
17 A. Dirk Moses, ‘Genocide and Settler Society in Australian History’, in idem (ed.), Genocide and Settler Society,
38–40.
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that Aboriginal culture was incompatible with settler Australian society.18 Significantly, they left
intact the ideal of a racially homogenous Australia, albeit (in the segregationist vision) one
spotted with entrapped, definitively different Aboriginal peoples.19
Between the wars, exceptions to this general rule were few.  Settler Australian policy
elites proposed only two plans for Aborigines that challenged the white Australia policy.20 The
first peaked in the late 1920s, when Colonel Genders, Secretary of the Aborigines’ Protection
League of South Australia, gathered the support of an array of anthropologists and prominent
persons for a ‘Model Aboriginal State’. They attempted to provide Aborigines with an
opportunity to develop a modern polity, under white tutelage, but on Aboriginal land, segregated
from dissipating influences.21 In 1928, the Minister for Home Affairs condemned the scheme as
unworkable (Ch. 8). Genders had attempted to apply the ideal of self-determination to Australian
circumstances, but with little knowledge of Aboriginal culture or administration. The other plan
for assimilation through Aboriginal cultural continuity was Elkin’s.22
                                                
18 Often, the alternatives co-existed in the one policy. For instance, John Bleakley, Chief Protector of Aborigines in
Queensland, who was the only administrator responsible for a large population of Aborigines who opposed the
absorption policy, proposed the segregation of full-bloods and the enculturative assimilation of half-castes. See JW
Bleakley, The Aborigines and Half-Castes of Central and Northern Australia, report to the Commonwealth,
Queensland, 1928; and idem, ‘Can our Aborigines be Preserved’, EP 1/12/1, 3.
19 The widely held theory that Aborigines were Caucasian led people to believe that race-mixing would produce a
white population. See Anderson, Cultivating Whiteness, 198-205.
20 In the 1930s, communists advocated the ‘decolonisation of Australia’. They were influential amongst Aboriginal
protesters whose assimilationist vision did not entail the elimination of racial distinctiveness, see Attwood, Rights for
Aborigines, 43–53. But communists’ foothold in the union movement in the 1930s did not result in changes to
unions’ policy or membership in that decade, see Ch. 4 and Julia Martinez, ‘The Limits of Solidarity: The North
Australian Workers Union as Advocate of Aboriginal Assimilation’, in Rowse, Contesting Assimilation, 101–118.
Also, assimilationists other than Elkin were influential in the 1930s, although they generally followed Elkin’s lead.
See Attwood, Rights for Aborigines, 103–30; and compare the dates of Elkin’s key statements (Ch. 8) with the dates
of key statements in Alison Holland, ‘Saving the Race: Critics of Absorption Look for an Alternative’, in Rowse
(ed.), Contesting Assimilation, 85–99. See also note 22.
21 Kevin Blackburn, ‘White Agitation for an Aboriginal State in Australia (1925–1929)’, Australian Journal of
Politics and History 45 (2), 1999, 157–80.
22 Three other contenders (in addition to communists in the union movement, as at note 20) deserve mention. The
Chief Protector of Aborigines in Queensland, John Bleakley, was not hostile to Aborigines’ racial continuity, but he
encouraged enculturation via Aborigines’ children, rather than acculturation via the elders and guardians of cultural
continuity. JW Bleakley, The Aborigines and Half-Castes of Central and Northern Australia, report to the
Commonwealth, Queensland, 1928.  See Chs. 6 and 8.  The Rev. JRB Love pursued an acculturative project amongst
the Worora people in remote north-western Western Australia but his prognoses for the continent overall were
strongly enculturative. See Ch. 6; and compare his Stone-Age Bushmen of Today: Life and Adventure among a Tribe
of Savages in North-western Australia (London: Blackie & Son, 1936) with Rev. JRB Love, ‘What the Missions are
Doing’, Steads’ Review August 1, 1930, 14–16. Another important agent of assimilation with acculturative features,
such as preservation of language and ties to land, was Dr Charles Duguid.  He developed his ideas on assimilation
and Christian mission ‘from 1934’, and initially along lines advocated by Elkin. See Sitarani Kerin, ‘ “Dr do-good”?:
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Our focus is the seminal years from 1928 to 1933. C. D. Rowley has shown that this
period was a turning point in twentieth century Aboriginal affairs.23 The years 1928 and 1933
were each characterised by national outrage at injustices suffered by Aborigines, but only in 1933
did this outrage find expression in a new policy. This change was possible, we will argue, in part
because Elkin spent those five years resolving intellectual conflicts between realistic and
idealistic analyses of colonialism, and personal spiritual questions about how his thirst for
practical scientific expertise fitted with his complex and conflicted religious commitment. The
result of Elkin’s efforts was moral clarity (that settler Australians were obliged to attempt to
support Aborigines’ acculturative assimilation) directing strategic scientific enquiry (such that
Australian anthropology should not support segregationist or eliminationist arguments).
This personal settlement of the relation between morality, science, public opinion and
policy is the prime subject of our thesis; its issue in important policy developments is also
central, but of secondary concern.  Elkin’s policy position, as we will soon see, has already been
well understood, thanks particularly to the work of Russell McGregor.  Less well appreciated has
been the crisis through which Elkin arrived at that position.
Elkin radically changed the direction of his thinking about Aboriginal affairs in the years
1928 to 1931. Seemingly against self-interest, he abandoned his commitment, based on his
doctoral study, to racial science as the pre-eminent guide to Aboriginal affairs. As we will see,
the combination of racial and cultural science in which he was trained was an ideal portfolio for a
career in anthropology, which he badly wanted.  He valued racial science for the guidance he
believed (until 1930-1931) it could provide to those whose responsibility it was to formulate
policy for the Australian nation.
But personal morality prevailed in the crisis that is the centrepiece of our study.  That
crisis expressed a lifelong experiential complex, which we trace from Elkin’s childhood.  From a
wider perspective, the crisis expressed the conflict between Elkin’s conception of Christian
relations with Aborigines and the prevailing idea of what ought to be the relationship between
scientist and subject.  These different ways of relating clashed in 1928 in the field; Elkin resolved
                                                                                                                                                             
Charles Duguid and Aboriginal Politics, 1930-1970s’, PhD thesis, Australian National University, 2004, 17-20, 37-
39, 64.
23 Rowley, Destruction of Aboriginal Society, 255–340.
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the conflict in 1931; he built a national campaign on that resolution in 1932-33. We will study
these developments, and the background to them.
The decision to concentrate on Elkin’s intellectual formation and then only five of his
years as a publicist in Aboriginal affairs has costs and benefits. One benefit of concentrating on
the years 1928 to 1933 is chronological. By studying how one thing led to another during these
seminal years, we see how Elkin arrived at acculturative policies through his own private
struggles and not by building upon contemporary practices or even arguments in Australian
Aboriginal affairs. Elkin then publicised his version of assimilation on the national stage in a
variety of forums.  It is surely significant that only after these years of publicity did any national
momentum develop behind acculturative arguments and practices.24
We conclude in 1933 because Elkin’s career from 1934 is already well known. Elkin did
not spring into history as a ‘humanitarian’ deus ex machina in 1934.  Spiritual, intellectual and
scientific challenges preceded his moral clarity. By detailing the struggles that led Elkin to his
acculturative position, we may understand how Elkin produced a new and enduring set of
priorities in Australian Aboriginal affairs.
One cost associated with our time frame is that, beyond this claim of Elkin’s primacy, we
cannot here assess Elkin’s influence.  Elkin’s career was long, and his vision of acculturative
assimilation continued to develop after 1933.  His influence arguably peaked in late 1938 and
early 1939, when he co-wrote, with Minister for Home Affairs John McEwen and the
Department’s Secretary, J. A. Carrodus, a national policy for Aborigines.  The closer reckoning
of Elkin’s influence must be left to future historians.  This thesis prepares the way by
illuminating – in the round – the foundation of Elkin’s achievement.
Elkin – priest, publicist, and professor – intended specific knowledge groups to advance
the acculturative ideal. For Christian or scientific audiences, he advocated the acculturative
project, and explicitly rejected the enculturative alternative. That is, for these sectors of society he
propounded the view that settler Australians ought to support Aboriginal groups to adapt
themselves collectively to the society that had engulfed them.  He aimed quickly and thoroughly
to change the minds of those in these inner circles of opinion.
                                                
24 See Kerin, ‘ “Dr do-good”?: Charles Duguid and Aboriginal Politics’, 17-20, 37-39.
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He anticipated a more gradual turning of the wider public’s opinions concerning
Aboriginal affairs. The vehicle he deployed for this second track of publicity was his open-ended
‘positive policy’, which was interpreted by many, including Dr Cecil Cook, Chief Protector of
Aborigines in the Northern Territory, to imply a continuation of eliminationist assimilation.25
Elkin stated the imperative that Aborigines ought to benefit from as full as possible participation
in the settler society; but he also urged (contra Cook) that racialist considerations should be
demoted relative to psychological factors. For the general public, he propagated an attitude to
Aboriginal affairs that was compatible with white Australian expectations and also with a trend
towards acculturation.
The originality of Elkin’s policy contribution in these years is starkly illustrated by the
fact that he was the leading or the only advocate of an acculturative policy in each of these
sectors of Australian opinion – scientific, general public, or Christian. Elkin, uniquely, sought to
transform all three sectors of opinion. What explains his singularity, and who were his allies?
II
We know little about the important part played in Aboriginal affairs by religious traditions or
other contexts for religious thinking. The influence of Christianity in general has been negligible,
according to most historians of Australian liberalism, British social anthropology, and twentieth
century Australian Aboriginal affairs. But Elkin’s civic ideals and his attitude towards publicity
reflected an amalgam of Catholic Anglican commitment and Idealist moral philosophy, the latter
associated with T. H. Green’s ‘new liberalism’.26 In forming his anthropological ideas, he
considered the arguments made by champions of religious faith against secular thinkers such as
Friedrich Nietzsche, Émile Durkheim, James Frazer, Grafton Elliot Smith and A. R. Radcliffe-
Brown. And his contribution to Aboriginal affairs was shaped (in ways scarcely noticed since C.
D. Rowley’s work in the early 1970s) by scholarship centred upon the Melanesian Mission; by
precedents set by Christian imperialists, particularly Australia’s Lieutenant-Governor of Papua,
Hubert Murray; and by Anglicanism’s civic-religious ambit, including the Association for the
Protection of Native Races.
                                                
25 Wise, Self-Made Anthropologist, 144.
26 I will capitalise ‘Idealism’ when referring to the moral philosophy, to differentiate it from ‘idealism’ as the
disposition to pursue unlikely outcomes.
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Elkin pursued first religious, then moral, and then scientific arguments for his proposed
reconciliation of traditional Aboriginal and settler Australian ends. He did so in fulfilment of his
Christian commitment and Idealist moral philosophy, closely related traditions that we will group
together as ‘Christian Idealism’. Elkin attempted to reformulate the core Anglican faith claims –
including sanctions meant to preserve the corporate discipline of the church– so that Anglicanism
was compatible with non-dogmatic, critical philosophy. He sought an epistemological framework
that would support the free play of reason upon a base of religious discipline. John Toews has
usefully analysed this kind of framework as the integration of existential, social, and political
planes of being, a scheme it is useful to develop for our own purposes.27
Existence, for adherents of this tradition, was paradoxical: both radically free (and so
individualistic) and necessarily characterised by submission and mortality. Crucially, Christian
Idealists resolved the paradox through faith and affirmation, not reason and abstraction. They saw
existence as rational, and yet knowable only through the religious attitudes that provided the right
spiritual and relational context for social understanding. The word ‘spiritual’ in this thesis refers
to the interaction of conscious processes with unknown (as against supernatural) forces, issuing
in effective motivation. For Elkin, religious faith adhered – dynamically, admitting profound
changes in response to different phases of his scholarship – to ritual and symbolic responses to
the problem of mortality.
Christian Idealists saw society as a field of obligation. Continuing Green’s Idealist legacy,
and convinced by Durkheim’s teachings that a symbolic unifying system was a prerequisite for a
society’s persistence, Elkin believed that society had rights over the individuals who comprised
it..28 Moreover, with other Anglican Catholics he believed that most people, himself included,
needed social guidance, in local communities, on their spiritual way. These beliefs disposed him
towards social analysis that was both group-oriented and conservative.
A political agenda followed directly from these existential and social purposes.
‘Idealism’, at least the British and Australian variants with which we are most concerned,
denoted a commitment to the free forming of opinions concerning the practical ways in which
                                                
27 John Edward Toews, Hegelianism: The Path Toward Dialectical Humanism, 1805-1841 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1980), 4–14.
28 AP Elkin, ‘The Rights of Man in Primitive Society’, in UNESCO (ed.)Human Rights: Comments and
Interpretations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), 239. For Green’s theory of rights, see Ch. 1; for
Durkheim’s sociology see Ch. 3.
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personal liberty and social fellowship could be mutually advanced towards wider and more
complex unity. British Idealism was in part an outgrowth of the nineteenth century Incarnationist-
Christian embrace of evolutionary theory. In arriving at his mature religious position, Elkin found
spiritual inspiration for a universalist civic Idealism by integrating the stimulus and the challenge
afforded by Darwin and Durkheim (Ch. 7).  These mutually supporting planes of existential faith,
social affirmation, and civic ideals comprise our central subject.
Elkin’s Christian Idealism shaped his reform of Aboriginal affairs. During a decade of
gestation, Elkin derived his reformist policy primarily from his Christian Idealism. Elkin began
his study of Aboriginal religion in order to illustrate the unity of human religious experience as a
socially mediated approach to the spiritual unity of which he believed all people were part. When
events turned his mind to the question of how the very different fields of Aboriginal and settler
Australian social obligation could be reconciled, he referred to the common ground of existential
religion. The fundamental obligation for Aborigines, as for settlers, was to perpetuate their
corporate existence. The only practical, politically viable way forward for Aborigines as a distinct
people or as distinct peoples, Elkin believed, was to cultivate the religious sources of individual
fulfilment and social unity even as the territorial, economic, and socio-structural bases for their
religion underwent radical change.
The same Christian Idealist conviction sustained both his work as a publicist, reforming
Australian opinion, and his work as an expert anthropologist, informing policy in Aboriginal
affairs. Since the 1980s, historians have charged Elkin with a kind of hypocrisy for expecting
more change from Aboriginal peoples than he did from the Europeans who had dispossessed
them.29 The reasons for this bias conform to the structure in which Elkin operated: the asymmetry
between the two sides that competed for possession of the continent. But the distinctive, as
against structurally typical, quality of Elkin’s contribution to Australian history stemmed from
his faith that both Aborigines and settlers might respect and participate in their different, equally
ancient dynamics of change; that is, that both cultures might maintain religious continuity.
III
                                                
29 Mulvaney, ‘Australasian Anthropology’, 216; Gray, ‘From Nomadism to Citizenship’, passim.
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A related commonality that Elkin inferred from his analyses of settler and Aboriginal change was
the importance of gradual advances in public opinion. Aborigines had no hope of overthrowing
their dispossessors; their best hope lay in mental independence and problem-solving, Elkin learnt
from early social psychologists. The only basis for collective empowerment available to
Aborigines was the decisions they could make about how best to redirect their shared beliefs
towards an accommodation with the society that had engulfed them. Similarly, white Australians
could only render their possession of Aborigines’ land honourable by squaring it with their own
moral code, that is, by modifying their relation to Aborigines in the light of higher principles.
In the crucial years of the early 1930s, Elkin exhorted settlers to ‘create a public opinion’
conducive to Aboriginal advance; and to expect and assist Aborigines similarly to create new
public opinions of their own that would enable this advance.30 In its latter aspect especially, this
vision was original. ‘A public opinion’, implied a judgement about a preferred collective course
of action, or a preferred course of action with implications for the whole society. In the face of
‘industrial civilization’ and its continual change, this kind of opinion admitted little predictability.
But Elkin’s attitude towards public opinion meant that he felt no need to anticipate an end result:
he was advocating a religious kind of opinion formation, which he considered a good in its own
right. He believed (recalling our analysis of his Christian Idealism), that this kind of opinion
ensured that partners in change would safeguard each other’s existential security, social
belonging, and political interests.
Public opinion had social ‘breadth’ as well as historical ‘depth’, Elkin wrote.31 He
believed that individuals could make effective and sustainable contributions to movements in
public opinion only by aligning their thinking with long (or deep) historical trends. At the same
time, he believed that the wider one’s conception of the public, the higher one’s moral aspiration
was likely to be. He attempted to make Australian opinion answerable to the best in international
opinion, and modelled his publicity upon that of international religious organisations.32 So while
                                                
30 AP Elkin, A Policy for the Aborigines (Sydney: Association for the Protection of Native Races, 1934). Address
presented to APNR Annual Meeting, 21 April 1932. On Aboriginal opinion, see AP Elkin, Understanding the
Australian Aborigine:  lecture delivered in Sydney at a meeting of the APNR, 23 June 1931, (Morpeth, St. John’s
College Press, 1931), 21.
31 AP Elkin, Society, the Individual and Change: with Special Reference to War and Other Present-Day Problems
(Sydney: Camden College, 1940).
32 AP Elkin ‘The Changing World’, Morpeth Review III (27), April 1934, 88–91, at 91; on religious models, see Ch.
8.
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attending closely to historical Aboriginal difference from settler Australian norms, he also cast
Aborigines and settler Australians together in the gaze of the rest of the world – and presumed
that the rest of the world would furnish standards higher than would the nation left to its own
logic.
Elkin believed his worldview afforded sufficient universality to comprehend and guide
the kinds of cultural changes that Aborigines had to attempt. A survey of some of the literature
that has informed my understanding of Elkin’s work, and the significance of the traditions within
which he worked, will provide the origins and context for Elkin’s Christian Idealism. The
following review of relevant literature will also illumine Elkin’s part in the history of
anthropology and the history of both Aboriginal affairs and liberal thought in Australia.
Literature Review
Our argument – that Christian faith and a Christian Idealist intellectual milieu were crucial to
Elkin’s contribution to Aboriginal affairs and Australian anthropology – sits within the history of
the ideas of Idealism, anthropological structuralism, cultural liberalism, and public opinion. As an
undergraduate during World War One, and again in response to the Depression and the rise of
totalitarianism, Elkin sought to advance public opinion. He sought to contribute to an
increasingly complex, democratic, and representative co-ordination of purposes. Such a process
produced a higher social and political unity, encompassing a higher good, he believed. His ideal
of a progressive teleology without any necessity for dogmatic religious underpinning, and
involving a distinction between ‘spiritual facts’ and ‘spiritual ideals’ was a mode of Hegelian
Idealism.33  Elkin studied Idealism, as revised by T. H. Green, with Francis Anderson, the
professor of philosophy under whose supervision Elkin obtained his Honours and Masters
degrees. Over three decades later, Elkin was still quoting Green with approval, as we will see in
Chapter One.
Charles Taylor’s monograph on Hegel clearly sets out the German’s moral philosophy.34
Hegel rejected the model of freedom that he perceived in the philosophies of Kant and Rousseau,
which he believed resulted in the Terror during the French Revolution. Hegel argued that Kantian
liberalism could not get beyond an individualised, ultimately fragmentary ideal. Hegel argued,
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against Kant, that freedom was dialectical, an interplay of the Kantian individual rational will
(perceiving absolute goods such as the individual’s freedom of conscience and the impulse in an
individual to support that freedom in others) with actually existing communal obligation, such as
law and custom. Morality reached its completion in a community, not in an altruistic individual
conscience, Hegel argued.35 Since the individual was complete only as part of a community,
rationality must begin from the individual as tending towards communal fulfilment. From this
premise, Hegel developed his doctrine of the rational state.36
John Toews, in his intellectual biography of Hegel and Hegel’s philosophical successors,
has convincingly argued that Hegel responded to a ‘cultural disinheritance’.37 The intellectual as
well as political revolution of 1789, given political urgency in Germany because of Napoleon’s
conquests there, required a new ‘cultural ideology’ to replace the remnants of feudalistic
Christian thinking. Hegel’s account of the modern state – a blend of mystical faith in spiritual
unity and philosophical faith in rational system – was a radical new beginning, in Toews’
account.
Toews has shown how philosophers from Hegel to Marx overcame cultural disinheritance
by creating ‘cultural ideologies’. These constructs were rationalist alternatives to traditional
Christian personal integrity, the basis of which, many intellectuals found, had lost credibility.
Christianity had integrated the individual’s spiritual origins, communal belonging, and political
purpose in God and God’s order. That completeness must, in the modern era, be found in
rationality alone, the Hegelians believed. Such was the origin of the self-sufficient, ‘scientific’
ideology of Marxism, for example. Marxism was, for its adherents, a powerful cultural ideology
because it integrated a (materialist) personal ontology with a version of communal belonging
(classes) and a political project (revolution).
The Australian-British version of Idealism that Elkin inherited had defaulted on Hegel’s
bolder claims to a total understanding of spirit, and had retained instead an agnostic sympathy
with a religious submission to mystery or transcendence. Following Hegel, Elkin believed that an
intellectual’s role was to reveal and lead others towards a higher moral unity; but in British
Idealist mode, Elkin (eventually, and most characteristically) had recourse to faith to discern
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moral direction; he deployed rationality only secondarily to find the practical means by which
that direction could be pursued. Our source key for this context is a biography of the founder of
British Idealism, T. H. Green38 (The biography is also an account of the fundamental importance
and complex cross-currents of religion in opinion formation in nineteenth century England, to
which we will return.)
Toews’ useful idea of cultural ideology as a substitute for the structural integrity of
religious faith has its less spectacular counterpart in Green’s and other British interpretations of
Hegel. Perhaps because of the arguments for gradual reform that accompanied both Britain’s
avoidance of revolution and her loss of the American colonies, as opposed to the Napoleonic
upheaval in Europe, Idealism in England became an attempt to find a modern form for a
continuous Christian or agnostic cultural inheritance.
Melvin Richter has shown that T. H. Green made only modest claims for his metaphysics
and epistemology and emphasized instead his non-dogmatic restatement of Christian ethics.39
Richter showed how Green taught a version of Christian principles and ethics. Green’s Idealism
required and inspired a political program that has become known as a ‘new liberalism’: a politics
of positive freedom, supposed to ensure that every individual enjoyed the opportunities to be
their best self, and participate in a virtuous cycle of spiritual abundance and service.
Toews’ account of structuralist ideology as an intellectual base for personal integrity is
pertinent in a moderated form to British and Australian Idealists in the early twentieth century.
Although the latter attempted to realise continuity with core aspects of their Christian inheritance
– such as individualism, voluntarism, personal obligation to serve outsiders and the less fortunate,
and local communities of fellowship – intellectual changes necessitated some version of the
‘cultural ideology’ that characterised continental Hegelianism. Intellectuals who read Darwin,
Nietzsche, and Durkheim developed a liberal notion of culture to replace Christian dogma.
                                                
38 Melvin Richter, The Politics of Conscience: TH Green and his Age (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964).
39 Richter’s text is still amongst the best expositions of Green’s ethical philosophy and its practical political effects,
but for Green’s importance as an influence upon theories of the state, see Julia Stapleton, ‘Political Thought, Elites
and the State in Modern Britain’, Historical Journal 42 (1999), 251–268. I have also benefitted from the following:
Peter Nicholson, ‘Thomas Hill Green: Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation’, in Murray Forsyth and
Maurice Keens-Soper (eds.), The Political Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 17–36; Peter Weiler,
The New Liberalism: Liberal Social Theory in Great Britain 1889–1914 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1982);
John R. Rodman, The Political Theory of TH Green (New York: Meredith, 1964). For Green’s writings, see RL
Nettleship (ed.), Works of Thomas Hill Green, 3 vols. (London: Longmans, 1885–1890), especially Green’s Lecture
on Political Obligation  (Vol. 1).
Introduction
15
The historian Gregory Melleuish has coined the phrase ‘cultural liberalism’ with other
debates in mind, but his term and the tradition he thus labelled fit our concerns nicely.40
Melleuish analysed the scholarly milieu that predominated at the University of Sydney, in Elkin’s
undergraduate years there. The central figure in the cultural liberal tradition, Francis Anderson,
taught a non-dogmatic version of Christian moral philosophy that he glossed as ‘the principle of
personality’. Anderson celebrated Green as a salutary ‘modern philosopher’.41 As mentioned,
Anderson supervised Elkin’s Honours and Masters theses. Anderson’s archetypal personality was
Jesus, who combined personal freedom (love and will) with principled obligation (law and
faithfulness).42 One developed personality by finding self-fulfilment in one’s entire heritage, and
so transcending petty or sectional interests, Anderson taught.43
Anderson’s world-view provided the three planes of integration that we have identified
(following Toews) as typical of Idealists. The individual, properly educated, was spiritually and
existentially secure in the universal fatherhood of God. Social belonging, in Anderson’s teaching,
was achieved through education into the full heritage of Christendom (including crucial inputs
from other religious traditions, notably Buddhism), its associated technologies and economy, and
its Australian setting. Anderson’s political plane of integration was an extension of this idea of
ongoing historical heritage: Christendom had bequeathed its students a noble and ongoing
project, to afford all people the conditions for a full personality. Melleuish has shown that
Anderson’s faith in an open universal order that supported humanity’s political efforts (‘kosmos’)
contrasted with rival strands of liberal political culture in Australia, such as that exemplified by
Charles Pearson (below).
Thus Anderson’s principle integrated the three planes that Toews identified as a chief
cause of Idealism’s prevalence amongst modern intellectuals. Unlike the continental Hegelians,
Anderson based his philosophy upon core Christian principles, which he taught should guide the
thinker until someone discovered a higher revelation. And so the Australian variant of Idealism
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was closer to its British parent, emphasizing a continuous faith, than its German grandparent,
which in providing a cultural ideology to make good a cultural disinheritance emphasized rational
system.
II
British Idealism and Australian cultural liberalism each looked to education, opinion-formation
and piecemeal progressive legislation to move society towards a higher morality while fulfilling
present customary obligations. This kind of pragmatic, progressive approach has been propagated
by a leading contemporary heir of German Hegelianism, Jürgen Habermas, in his key critical
history of ‘the public sphere’.44
Habermas argued that structural transformations in public opinion both gave birth to and
mis-shaped liberal democracy. The argument warrants our close attention as context for our
treatment of Elkin’s universalist aspiration as a publicist, and because it provides both a critique
of Idealism, and an unwitting rationale for it. In our treatment of Habermas, we enquire into the
relation between opinion, reason, and faith.
Habermas studied public opinion as an exclusively secular phenomenon. He traced the
history of the relation between opinion-making communities and political freedoms, beginning
with the agonistic ideology of the aristocrats of ancient Athens. They identified public opinion
with the competition between citizens to best represent the interests of the community of free
men: the polity. Feudalism privatised and personified in the monarch the notion of the public
good, reducing freedom to the will of one man. Habermas showed how Enlightenment liberals
especially in England reconceived the public good as a universal potentiality, which they claimed
to represent on behalf of every citizen.
The liberals’ pretence was, for Habermas, the great hinge of liberal and democratic
history, but he failed to account for it satisfactorily. He ascribed the new universal imagination to
the ‘intimate performativity’ that characterised the novel-reading bourgeois household, with its
mythos of perfect equality among family members under the father’s benevolence.45 He ignored
religion – a rather more obvious and likely source of the ‘illusion of the universal’ upon which
his argument turned. This omission is all the more striking given the scope and excellence of
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Habermas’s analysis of the rise (1770s to 1830s) and decline (1830s to 1950s) of democratic
publicists’ universalist aspiration.
Habermas argued firstly that the ideal of a universally relevant and productive politics of
opinion was the key to liberal democracy, and secondly that the correction of a liberal elite’s self-
interested presumption to represent the universal ideal unilaterally, as it were, was the free path to
a socially just democracy. In Habermas’ account, liberal publicists won freedoms from the state
in the name of all citizens but these freedoms were commandeered by profit-making
corporations. As capitalists entrenched their power, they achieved a refeudalisation of public
opinion, whereby ‘publicity’ came to designate what corporations wanted people to know.
Liberal publicists’ illusion of the universal had never been realised. Habermas concluded by
suggesting that his readers should pursue a society-wide praxis of ‘communicative activity’ that
would lead, in his view, to participatory democracy based on real increases in mutual
understanding, to replace unwarranted assumptions about common or universal interests.
By overlaying Habermas’ narrative with Richter’s account of the religious origins of
nineteenth century movements in British liberalism, we can reinterpret Habermas’s argument.
The religious revision of his argument would hold that the universal ideal was necessarily
illusory, and only sustainable as an object of faith. The crux of the matter is the perennial
question of the relation between reason – here in the guise of a rational, universalist political
agenda – and faith.
The reform movement of the 1830s is the best point from which to survey this parting of
analytical ways. Habermas lamented the reduction from the 1830s of the project of winning
freedom from the state (cherished by the late eighteenth century enlightenment liberals) to the
initiative-sapping passivity through which the mass of voters achieved basic advances by means
of representative electoral politics. But even if the English masses were politically passive in the
nineteenth century (and acknowledging only in passing E. P. Thomson’s refutation of that idea),
Christian and other universalist publicists continued to propagate and carry universalist projects.
For as the franchise extended, the Methodist revival moralised and inspirited entire villages46;
and Anglicanism reinvented itself as Incarnationists and Tractarians (amongst others) propagated
new, spiritual, universalist reasons for faith in gradual progress through a blend of obedience,
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civility, and faith in higher ideals. As the politics of opinion massified, a parliamentary labour
party developed and flourished, slaves were freed around the globe, and the militaristic British
Empire began gradually to reinvent itself as a liberal commonwealth. Richter and before him
Halevy (and many others to be sure) have mapped some of the connections between resurgent
religious commitment and partial, compromised but significant advances in liberal politics.
These events – to each of which Elkin referred recurrently – were the historical precursors
of Elkin’s practical achievements. This thesis is an attempt to show the effects of Elkin’s spiritual
commitment to the universalist Christian tradition and its expression in reformist publicity. For it
was precisely through faith in a religious conception of the universal that Elkin integrated his
spiritual aspiration with social and political commitments to a widening common good. That is,
Elkin’s attempts at opinion formation became effective only once they aligned with and became a
product of his religious faith and religious modes of civic association. Our enquiry is a case study
of how faith in religious symbols and practices has provided an historically proven route to the
universalist mode of understanding of which Habermas has been the foremost proponent in recent
decades.
Habermas, in rejecting culturally specific symbols arranged around a non-rational solution
to the problem of mortality – along with the poetic and symbolic modes in general47 – may have
thrown the baby out with the bathwater, if you will forgive the idiom. Religiously articulated
publicity and scholarship – compromised and agnostic in its association with the life and death
events of a diverse community of faith, including the unreflective and the taciturn – has borne
fruit more palatable than attempts to reorient society according to any wholly rational system.48
In case Habermas’ faith in stand-alone reason should be misplaced, we might want to remember
how Christian Idealists sustained a mode of scholarship in harmony with a liberal-universalist
religious tradition.
III
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Habermas’s critique of liberal ideology has a counterpart in Australian intellectual history in the
early work of Tim Rowse.49 Rowse argued that Australian liberals sustained their faith in
consensus by overlooking the unjust conflict of interests inherent in relations between capital and
labour. Liberalism, as an overarching rationale for capitalism, equated labour and profit as social
goods – an inhumane position, Rowse argued. Like Habermas, Rowse focussed on the illusion of
consensus. Even though the illusion had real effects, these historians conceded, including mass
advances in material well-being and access to education, the structural reality of oppression
persisted.
Australian liberal reformers were aware of this fundamental problem, but did not respond
to it adequately, Rowse argued. Liberal reformers experienced a kind of bad faith because their
self-image was continually being undermined.50 They wanted to see themselves as universalists
and altruists, but the structure of capitalism ensured that their efforts kept disproportionately
benefiting the owners of capital and their assistants, the middle class. Rowse included Elkin,
whom he grouped with the Idealists and ‘social reconstructionists’, in this class of liberal
reformers.
Rowse assumed that these liberals lacked a viable rationale for their own entrapment in
capitalism. But the religious outlook of Elkin and other Christian Idealists invalidates this
assumption. Their Christian learning and practice contained central, unavoidable elements of
fatalism: the mythology of the fall and Jesus’ crucifixion, for instance. Green made
‘complacency’ the central vice against which Idealists should guard (Ch. 1). Elkin urged his
parishioners to strive ‘to attain the unachievable’ (Ch. 7). Christians, we can generalise, were
primed to expect history to produce a stream of disappointing results, and to keep striving for a
different outcome without hope of achieving much change beyond their own community. The
fruit of this combination of fatalism and faith was, in many cases including Elkin’s, not naivete or
insincerity so much as commitment, persistence, and a constructive attitude towards social
relations from local community to nation-state, and beyond.
Like Habermas, Rowse has made a lasting and valuable contribution by illustrating that a
praxis born of the illusion of consensus has served to loosen and mitigate but not undo structural
inequalities in a particular time and place. But again like Habermas, Rowse did not account for
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the resilience of reformers who knew the Sisyphean nature of their task. This contribution that
Christian Idealists made to intellectual life in Australian in the early twentieth century has been
unwittingly indicated by Michael Roe. In reviewing Roe’s history, we introduce the importance
of the religious emphasis, combining rational and non-rational aspects, upon local fellowship and
group identity.
Michael Roe has written linked biographies of nine Australian reformers, not including
Elkin, whose influence peaked when Elkin was an undergraduate. Roe showed how
progressivism, an American reform movement that fused vitalism and modernism, linked the
public careers of his nine Australians in the first decades of the twentieth century.51 He claimed
that the progressive ‘trinity’ of Henri Bergson, Friedrich Nietzsche, and William James stood
behind the thinking of those Australian moderns who were ‘original’. The trinity were ‘more than
romantic in celebrating the non-rational aspect of man. Most new thinkers believed that from the
subjective, the intuitive, the emotional, the psychic, the inexpressible yearning-for-life, came
man’s most potent drives’.52
Roe’s argument concerning vitalism in Australia would have been more easily sustained
with reference to Elkin’s (or Anderson’s or Burgmann’s) exploration of religious tradition than it
was with reference to Roe’s protagonists’ occasional and disjointed spiritual musings. Roe’s
Australians made few if any references to any of his central three thinkers. Instead, Roe has
supposed that the new thought pervaded their thinking, while they in fact referred to Idealist
ethics and their complex but generally distant relation with Christian faith.53 If progressivism’s
‘ultimate tension was to claim the virtues of rationality, but at heart to be emotive and mystical,’
then Elkin was more clearly a progressive than any of Roe’s thinkers.54 We will see that Elkin
was certainly a vitalist religious thinker (Chs. 3, 7).
Roe failed to see that organised Christianity provided some moderns, including Elkin,
with a community as well as an ideology to support attempts to think through the implications of
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new ideas. By selecting Australian figures whose spiritual trajectories were solitary, Roe
hamstrung his declared aim of enquiring into the non-rational drives that he claimed fascinated
the generation. Elkin, in contrast to Roe’s nine Australians, sustained an intellectual enquiry into,
and disciplined cultivation of, non-rational drives, with the support of his fellow churchmen. He
tested his vitalism against their experiences and his own, and explicated it with reference to a
sophisticated body of doctrine and a subtle practice of worship, prayer, confession, communion
and other communal, non-rational rites and practices (Chs. 3, 7). Roe was right to highlight the
importance of attempts to make sense of and exploit non-rational social forces in early twentieth-
century Australia. But his focus upon vitalism as something that happened outside of
conventional religion obscured the relation between Australian vitalism and the spiritual
continuity that Melleuish has shown characterised the ‘cultural liberal’ tradition. Our study of
Elkin connects these two highways of Australian cultural and political history.
Other arguments concerning Australian liberalism similarly illustrate by omission the
importance of religion to the intellectual culture of Australia between Federation and 1939. At
Federation and in the decade thereafter, Charles Pearson (1830-1894) was Australia’s most
famous intellectual, and his protégé Alfred Deakin (1859-1919) was one of the new nation’s
leading politicians, and second Prime Minister. Elkin cited them both in his account of Australian
nationalism.55 Thus Stuart Macintyre’s history of the linked biographies of Melbourne-based
intellectuals that included Pearson as the hinge and ended with the rise of Deakin should provide
useful context for Elkin’s sense of Australian publicity.56
But Macintyre was unable or unwilling to credit the Christianity from which (by his own
account) the intellectual lineage that was his subject emerged. George Higginbotham (1826-
1892), the founding figure in Macintyre’s narrative was a liberal and staunch Anglican. When
Macintyre began his history with Higginbotham’s socialist niece reflecting upon her uncle’s
commemoration in 1937 that ‘the whole affair makes me wonder if there isn’t some essential lack
in us, something missing that keeps our life from having meaning and depth – interest in our past,
reverence for those who have shown outstanding qualities of mind or spirit’ – one might expect
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that religion would receive considered treatment.57 Instead, Macintyre has dismissed
Christianity’s teleology as ‘arbitrary’, described the founding Christian Socialist F. D. Maurice as
an intellectual influence as against a spiritual influence upon Pearson, and has lauded
Higginbotham as ‘surely unique in his sublime conviction of the divine element in all humanity’
– a distinction that Higginbotham himself would have found blasphemous.58 Macintyre’s history
does little to recover the ‘lost world’ that was at least nominally his subject.
A more profitable line of analysis of the intellectual milieu in which Elkin matured has
emerged from John Tregenza’s biography of Charles Pearson.59 Tregenza has shown the origins
in Pearson’s evangelical upbringing (both like and unlike T. H. Green’s) that led him to write to a
Melbourne clergyman in 1888 that ‘the doctrine of the Incarnation provides the only way of
understanding the mystery of the Universe. A God who should be law without sympathy and
will, would be to me an impossible and immoral conception.’60 But that road to understanding
had closed to Pearson: ‘the old forms are dying out, and in place of some new thought we are
treated to ingenious compromises or medieval revivals.’61 This sense of forced isolation from
corporate religious continuity surely contributed to Pearson’s bleak vision of the future of
liberalism: of town, church and family declining in importance; of each life’s meaning reducing
to an individualistic material prosperity and bureaucratically regulated physical security.62 The
religious frame of reference is indispensable for an understanding of Pearson’s outlook; in
particular, his disconnect with spiritual tradition was central to his most influential work.
A similar spiritual journey from a strict Evangelical childhood to a juridical vision of the
individual socialised with reference predominantly to the nation-state rather than intermediary
communities is evident in Paul Hasluck’s autobiography.63 Hasluck has told of his own
upbringing in a strongly evangelical (Salvation Army) household. Tim Rowse and Judith Brett
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have each argued that this spiritually isolated liberalism was the generative principle behind
Hasluck’s secular doctrine of enculturative assimilation.64 In contrast, Elkin’s Anglo-Catholic
faith and parish experience attuned him to the formation of identity through the intimate and pre-
rational action of the social group.
The local religious group and its part in the individual’s socialisation is the crucial link in
all this. Robert van Krieken has suggested, in an argument that contrasted Elkin’s acculturative
policy with Hasluck’s enculturative one, that intermediate social orders, including churches, play
an important role in attempts to prevent culturally genocidal effects that have issued from overly
juridical forms of liberal governance.65 Tregenza’s biography of Pearson points us to the twin
sources of Elkin’s parish-based practice of religious continuity: the ‘ingenious compromise’ of
non-dogmatic Christian Idealism, and the ‘medieval revivals’ of Tractarianism and Anglo-
Catholicism. Elkin, unlike Pearson, found these paths of religious continuity viable – but not
without a long struggle, and some awkward compromises.
Elkin’s concern with group religious identity was a fundamental aspect of his intellectual
formation. According to Stephen Alomes, excessive individualism was the characteristic failing
of Australian publicists in the 1930s.66 Alomes argued that on the whole these publicists were
‘reasonable men’ who advocated reform in the light of the massive injustices suffered during the
Depression. Alomes found that they were generally ineffective for one of two reasons. Some
neglected to enlist their socio-economic peers in their exhortations and plans for change for the
sake of the least powerful; others were content to work within the consensus that governments
should redress injustice only to the extent compatible with the primacy of individual freedom and
initiative. Alomes concluded that 1930s reformers ‘recognised few social categories between the
nation and the individual.’67 He noted that Elkin’s sociological perspective was an exception to
this rule, and that Elkin was exceptional in being the one effective publicist of the 1930s.
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According to Alomes, Elkin succeeded in effecting lasting change while in general his
peers did not. In 1974, Alomes asked Elkin to explain this phenomenon. Elkin replied that most
reformers did not know in practical terms what they wanted.
While he had a plan of action and concrete proposals [Alomes paraphrased] which he advanced through the press
and put to governments, with some success, they remained content with forums and thoughts. The problem stemmed
from an unwillingness to grapple with fundamental questions and follow them through to a conclusion.68
The fundamental question that Elkin pursued throughout the 1920s and most explicitly during his
most productive years as a publicist, the early 1930s, concerned the relation between religion,
obligation, faith, and freedom. In the five years following 1928 this question became: what must
Australians do to stand in a morally and spiritually acceptable relation to the country and its
Indigenous inhabitants? He believed there was an incontrovertible answer: that settler Australians
ought to include Aborigines in the benefits that flowed from intensive settlement, industrial
technology, and dynamic intercourse with the wider world.
In seeking the best means by which to pursue this aim, Elkin applied his sociological
insight that the crucial variable was ‘group life’. Elkin’s interest in group life linked his religious
enquiry with his social-psychological and anthropological enquiry. Elkin, along with other
pioneer sociologists, believed that Aborigines had an instinctive psychological need to persist as
a people (not just as families or individuals), but settlement and dispossession caused a morbid
psychology and a self-willed demise. Only religion could support this existential malaise, Elkin
came to believe. On the settler side, ‘group life’, at a national and international level, cohered in
large part around racial lines of inclusion and exclusion. Similarly, only religion, articulated with
civic Idealism, could overcome this group prejudice.
Thus Elkin found tentative hope in the fact that each side in this seemingly hopeless
combination of group dynamics also contained a religious dynamic. The religious practices and
beliefs of Indigenes and settlers alike centred on local groups of fellowship and socialisation. But
these practices and beliefs also opened out to a way of relating that sought and could achieve in
regular ritual experiences communion rationalised with reference to a transcendent way of being
that was also a source of moral authority. That is, religion provided, in the local experience of
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communion, the outlook and loyalty that could form the basis of an attempt to interpret group
norms in terms of universal moral ideals.  The interaction of religious groups provided the means
by which social change could occur both widely and thoroughly, and so on an enduring basis.
IV
Christian traditions and communities shaped Elkin’s publicity and his anthropology. The late
nineteenth and early twentieth century Australian religious context has not been much studied in
recent times.69 In this context we return to English religious histories and especially Melvin
Richter’s study of T. H. Green: a finely-grained account of the inter-relation in the latter
nineteenth century of some of the religious traditions and Idealist scholarship that influenced
Elkin, directly and through leading Anglo-Catholic and Australian followers of Green.
Elkin’s religiosity has been similarly ignored. Elkin’s biographer, Tigger Wise, noted that
Elkin named each of his sons after founders of Christian Socialism, but she did not enquire into
the influence of the Christian Socialists’ thinking or their example upon Elkin’s work in
Aboriginal affairs.70 No other published work has considered the influence of Christian Socialism
upon Elkin, although this movement shaped his Idealism and his Anglo-Catholicism.
Accounts of Christian Socialism from the perspective of its founders show that the
movement was a largely successful attempt by Anglican priests sympathetic to workers to keep
revolutionary labour within the bounds of the law and the teachings of the Church.71 That is, the
Christian Socialists attempted to divert the revolutionary labour movement of the 1840s into
consensual channels of opinion-formation, consistent with Christian corporatism and English
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reformism. To achieve this, the movement’s leaders, most notably the theologian F. D. Maurice,
revived and disseminated more broadly the Incarnationist Anglican tradition.
Maurice taught that the Trinity of God pervaded Creation, that God’s work of salvation
went forward in ‘this’ world (as against the idea that salvation referred only to an after-life), and
that God’s work was not constrained to his Church. As literary critics, intellectual biographers,
and historians of Christian mission have shown, Anglican Incarnationists from the 1840s held
that God revealed himself through evolution, and that for humans similarly gradual reform was
the natural and right way of things.72 The Christian Socialists, and Elkin after them (Ch. 1),
preached to workers and capitalists alike that concerning social justice, God was on labour’s side,
but concerning the means to that end, labour should look to their priests, who were looking
towards parliament.
Similarly, Green’s achievement, Richter has established, was to perpetuate by secular
opinion-oriented means the transcendent sense of justification that Christians, especially
Evangelical Christians, experienced as grace, or the assurance of salvation. Green’s most
influential followers responded to him as a rational and self-critical religious prophet. Richter has
argued that Green found succour for his religious doubts in the Christian rationalisation for good
deeds in this world provided by his maternal uncle who was a Christian Socialist (and whose
strong influence upon Green followed in part from the death of Green’s mother in his infancy).
Richter has shown, further, how Green similarly educated and broadened the Evangelical
spirituality of undergraduates he taught at Balliol College, Oxford – a generation characterised by
a crisis of faith. Green perpetuated the dynamic introspection of the Evangelical tradition but
directed it towards broader social ends. He transferred the qualities of spiritual aspiration and
commitment into a secular and philosophical version of the Christian Socialist tradition.
To complement Richter’s account of the religious origins, context, and effects of
Idealism, as well as histories of the Christian Socialist movement, I have referred also to the
history of the Tractarian strand in Anglican Catholicism.73 Richter has shown that, as a Fellow at
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Balliol College in Oxford, Green and especially his most influential students were disciplined by
the religious vision of the Tractarians and other High Anglicans whom the Tractarians inspired
and revitalised, often called Ritualists.74  The Tractarians had in the 1840s-1850s given new
authority to the old doctrine that right reason proceeded within the constraints of obedience to
Church hierarchy. By poetic, mystical, rhetorical, and sacramental means, they elaborated the
idea that the Church of England was ancient, continuous and Catholic.75
A shorthand for the two traditions just sketched is that the Incarnationists derived a
doctrine of political and secular obligation from the trans-historical, pseudo-scientific view of a
divine evolution; the Ritualists derived a doctrine of spiritual obligation from the long-historical
view of corporate, traditional religion. Both were corporatist ideologies that thrived in opposition
to laissez-faire, industrialism, the spiritual individualism of Evangelical Christianity, and the
atomisation of citizenship that became an increasing concern through the nineteenth century as
the franchise widened. Each based itself in a Christian spiritual practice – Church attendance,
prayer, repentance, communion – and pursued fundamental goals articulated with an idea of the
freedom of the individual soul; but one looked back to a primitive Christian ideal, and the other
looked forward to heaven on earth.
Elkin inherited the Anglo-Catholic reconciliation of these traditions led by Green’s
followers Charles Gore and F. Scott Holland. Elkin studied their writings as a young priest and in
turn Ernest Burgmann and he used them as study texts when they trained ordinands. Gore’s
writings remain a key brief account of this blend of Incarnationism and Ritualism that by the
latter nineteenth century had developed from the Tractarians’ lead.76 The salience of the Anglo-
Catholic project in Australia in Elkin’s day is evident in a collection of documents from the
1930s together with recent historical essays.77
V
Elkin’s modern religious milieu is also an important aspect of the history of anthropology.
Omissions in the historiography of anthropology especially indicate areas of advance we may
expect to make in the following chapters. Anthropology, in particular the study of Aboriginal
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religion, enters Tigger Wise’s biography of Elkin like a deus ex machina, resolving the
protagonist’s disabling doubt, and establishing a direction that he followed for the rest of his
career.78 Certainly, Elkin’s enquiry into Aboriginal religion was the central event of his
adulthood, but Wise did not consider the way in which that enquiry replicated a general scholarly
turn towards primitive religious experience as a source of light upon the nature and legitimacy of
modern Christianity.
Anthropology in general began with the hermeneutics required to make sense of the new
testament in relation to the old, Kenelm Burridge has argued.79 Modern anthropology was an
amplified version of this hermeneutic. Anthropologists provided a new view of humanity,
compatible with the long-historical perspectives of geological time and biological evolution, as
George Stocking has shown in his study of the beginnings of anthropology in the nineteenth
century.80
Stocking’s account of the development of modern anthropology suggests that Elkin’s
attempt to reconcile developments in social science with religious continuity was a general
feature of modern anthropological thinking. But, as Stocking is another historian who omits
religious themes from his treatment of the twentieth century, we have to supplement his context
with extensive use of the primary sources, to see how religious themes from the nineteenth
century persisted in the twentieth. Stocking’s histories of anthropology provide our key context
for understanding the anthropologists who shaped Elkin’s thinking, and the relation of the various
schools of anthropology to one another.
Stocking contrasted the nineteenth century search for clues to the nature of man and the
meaning of his culture with the twentieth century search for scientific laws and principles behind
the same. Stocking used E. B. Tylor as the hinge between two great eras of anthropology. The
continuity Stocking signalled with reference to Tylor was that twentieth century anthropology
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retained the universalist premises of the earlier era, which in Tylor’s case at least, Stocking linked
with monotheistic religious belief. This universalist purview remained characteristic of
anthropology despite important culturally relativist tendencies, issuing especially from the work
of Durkheim. Durkheim posited that reason issued from the dynamics through which societies
formed. If Durkheim’s thesis were true, then reason did not necessarily inhere more generally in
the natural world, and so human cultures were not based in rational nature.81
In turning his pen to twentieth century anthropology, Stocking discontinued his study of
religious enquiry.82 Stocking called his study of twentieth century anthropology After Tylor. In
his history of nineteenth century anthropology, Stocking stressed that Tylor was a Quaker
looking for new grounds for a universalist faith in the human spirit. But Stocking portrayed none
of his twentieth century protagonists as having religious or spiritual motivation behind their
scientific work. Stocking is the clear leader amongst historians of twentieth century
anthropology, and I have been unable to discover any contribution to the generalist
anthropological historiography that has made good this omission.
Robert Ackermann’s biography of James Frazer’s work reveals the way religion remained
a central motivator of anthropology into the twentieth century. Increasingly, anthropologists
propagated their discipline not as a replacement for religion but as its nemesis. In Ackermann’s
account, Frazer’s campaign against religion and the importance of his relationship with the
Christian William Robertson Smith – initially his mentor but eventually his antagonist – has
emerged clearly.83
Elkin, after his teacher Francis Anderson, was the most influential Australian proponent
of an international debate about the meaning of culture as it pertained to contemporary religious
and especially anti-religious concerns. Early sociologists and anthropologists, like the Idealists,
sought new intellectual explanations for religious practices and ethics. In particular,
anthropologists sought a history of culture that would defuse Nietzsche and others’ critiques of
Christian morality as unmitigated alienation.
                                                
81 Following a slightly different interpretation of Durkheim, Ernest Gellner has argued that sociologists need to read
Durkheim together with Max Weber to obtain a satisfactory, universalist conception or reason: see Ernest Gellner,
Reason and Culture: The Historic Role of Rationality and Rationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992), 30–54.
82 George W. Stocking, After Tylor (London: Athlone, 1995).
83 Robert Ackerman, James George Frazer: His Life and Work (Cambridge: CUP, 1987). For some intellectual and
disciplinary context, see Stocking, After Tylor, 124–51.
Anchorage in Aboriginal Affairs:
A.P. Elkin on religious continuity and civic obligation
30
Returning to Charles Taylor’s account of Hegel’s philosophy, we find that a fundamental
trope of modern philosophy and critical theory has followed from Hegel’s idea of alienation.
Hegel supposed that inadequate philosophies (that is, all prior to his own) had misconceived the
higher morality as mere dissatisfaction with the moral standards they observed in their own
societies; hence the religious notion of an otherworld that would one day supplant this world.84
Nietzsche’s development of this theme was the most radical instance of what Toews called
cultural disinheritance. Nietzsche saturated the idea of alienation with value and emotion.85
Priests were haters of power. Their story of an otherworldly reckoning was their mendacious
revenge upon their overlords, whose superiority in the arts of living they resented. As we will
see, much of Elkin’s anthropological context was shaped by Nietzsche’s powerful
reinterpretation of the meaning and value of religion.
Nietzsche’s influence upon Elkin came indirectly, through the Christian restatement that
his critique prompted. Pragmatist psychologists and anthropologists led by William James, most
notably R. R. Marett, replied that the serenity and loving kindness characteristic of many
religious people, and the potency of conviction and vision it produced in others, equally put paid
to Nietzsche’s thesis (Ch. 3). Religions were cultivators of the soul that supported the
achievement of a higher morality through effective psychological technique. By observing the
negative influence of Nietzsche upon the development of social anthropology we will be able to
see how Elkin’s guide to the new discipline combined philosophical Idealism with psychological
pragmatism to provide new arguments for religious, including Christian, experience.
Elkin’s involvement in this anthropological engagement with Nietzsche illustrates that
Elkin’s religious enquiry was conducted with reference to some of the most challenging ideas of
the day, within an intellectual community of faith that believed in open argument and critique.
This context helps explain why Elkin’s independence of mind, evident in his rejection of the
fundamental politics of race and of racialised nationality, even while he engaged in detailed
consideration of the likely consequences of racial differences, to which we turn below.
It is important in this regard to note the difference between apologetics and philosophy.
Elkin did not have a philosopher’s grasp of Nietzsche’s ideas, and his guide in these matters, R.
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R. Marett, showed only a superficial grasp of them.86 But one did not have to be a philosopher to
sense the profundity of the challenge to Christian continuity posed by the new intellectual turn
led by Nietzsche. Elkin probably did not read Nietzsche but was profoundly influenced by
Marett. Marett (like other Incarnationists, as above) embraced Darwin’s theory of evolution;
negotiated carefully with Durkheim’s sociological innovations and associated moral problems;
and attempted to provide direct responses to Nietzsche’s most famous challenges to Christian
faith. Both the leading historians of anthropology, George Stocking and Henrika Kuklick,
overlooked this sophisticated, three-fold religious apologetic that drove Marett’s innovations in
the theoretical basis of British social anthropological, and which Elkin followed.87
Stocking and Kuklick are, however, excellent guides to the lines of development internal
to the institutions and key players in British anthropology. Their histories show that Elkin was
following the British anthropological mainstream by moving from his studies of Marett to study
with the diffusionists, Grafton Elliot Smith, W. J. Perry, and to absorb the posthumous influence
of their close associate, W. H. R. Rivers. The diffusionists argued that significant cultural
developments such as the belief in an afterlife were exceptional, and much more likely to be
diffused through historical contacts than to have arisen simultaneously in different parts of the
world through some kind of ‘psychic unity’. But again, we have to return to the primary sources
to see the ongoing importance of religious and anti-religious debates in the diffusionist school.88
Elliot Smith and Perry, whose influence upon Elkin was most direct, developed the
Nietzschean idea that the priesthood was an instituted and sustained subversion of the intellect. In
this era of his life, Elkin quietly performed some agile intellectual footwork to marry the
diffusionist narrative with his own view of the priesthood.  This aspect of the intellectual history
has not been studied previously. Stocking and Kuklick each assumed that the religious debate
was no longer central to the development of anthropology, and Stocking disregarded Elliot Smith
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and Perry as extremists, rather than asking why the diffusionist narrative was successful, in the
academy and amongst the general public, for over a decade.
Henrika Kuklick has offered an explanation for diffusionism’s wide appeal.89 It offered a
broad explanation of culture, developed common sense premises, and benefited from the
authority of its leading scholars – Elliot Smith and Rivers were both generalists whose expertise
spanned the sciences and the humanities.90 We will see in following chapters how these two
leaders of diffusionism – whose differences have not been seriously explored until now – enabled
Elkin to blend expertise, moral energy, and religious authority.
Particularly important for the history of Aboriginal affairs was Rivers’ belief that colonial
governors in Melanesia should study the findings of social anthropology and the experience of
scholarly missionaries (Ch. 6). A new account of Rivers’ importance to Australian and other
southern colonial administrations is possible thanks to the work of the scholars of mission in
Melanesia, David Hilliard and Rebecca Sohmer.91 When we leave the metropolitan focus of
Stocking and Kuklick and, with Hilliard and Sohmer, attend closely to the southern periphery, we
see how Rivers made his anthropological breakthroughs in concert with the Melanesian Mission.
Here we return once again to the importance in Elkin’s milieu of religious debates. On the
one hand, traditionalists (Tractarians and Ritualists), emphasised submission and obedience, as
the conditions for religious reason; on the other hand, Incarnationists saw God’s work in the
application of reason to humanitarian ends anywhere. At the foundation of the Melanesian
Mission in the late nineteenth century, far from the political complications of theological debate
in England, Bishop Patteson and Christian anthropologist Robert Codrington reconciled the
strengths of these opposed positions.92 As a result, they retained their faith in the continuity and
expansion of the Christian church, while also crediting as genuinely religious the spiritual
discoveries and beliefs of the Melanesians they sought to instruct.
Rivers, influenced by these missionaries, promoted a combination of humility and
sympathy to the ‘native point of view’ as basic tenets of social anthropology. Rivers argued that
the missionaries’ methods provided a model that colonial governors ought to follow: begin from
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an understanding and respect for the thinking of those one intends to instruct or govern. On each
count, Elkin followed Rivers, whose terminology he adopted in his essays in ‘practical
anthropology’. Elkin found that, through Rivers’ work in applied anthropology, his Anglo-
Catholicism and his diffusionist anthropology were able to marry, despite the anti-religious
arguments of the other diffusionists. This new view of Rivers has become possible by reading the
historians of Melanesia together with Stocking’s work, and then returning to Rivers’ essays in
applied anthropology (ch. 6).93
Stocking and Kuklick agree that the third phase of twentieth century anthropology (after
the early rise of sociology at the hands of Marett, Rivers and Durkheim, and the diffusionist turn
to history) was functionalism, led by A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and  Bronislaw Malinowski.
Echoing his treatment of Durkheim, Stocking observed the influence of Nietzsche upon British
social anthropology only in its positive aspect. Stocking showed that Malinowski was directly
influenced by Nietzsche in building his influential version of functionalism on the idea that a
‘natural’ morality was vitalist and affirmative, in implicit contrast with (a Nietzschean conception
of) religious morality. Elkin (in his less imaginative way) benefited from and exploited
Malinowski’s lead in bringing a novelistic eye to the primitive’s point of view. But as we have
seen, Nietzsche was more significant to Elkin as an (indirect) antagonist.
VI
Thus religious themes shaped Elkin’s thinking at a fundamental level, even while he responded to
practical Australian political concerns by intensifying the study of racial science he began as a
doctoral candidate in Elliot Smith’s Department of Anatomy. We have a thorough guide to
Elkin’s involvement in Australian racialism in Russell McGregor’s history of scientific and other
prognoses, made between 1880 and 1939, that Aborigines would disappear as a distinct race.94
Our study of religion and opinion-formation affords a new perspective upon McGregor’s
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findings, by explaining how Elkin resisted and overcame the many Australian scientists who
sought to ‘cultivate whiteness’.95
McGregor concluded that on balance Elkin ‘demoted, rather than denied’ racialism.
(Racialism was the ascription of external reality to aspects of race that existed only in the minds
of beholders; this contrasts with racism, which was a set of negative connotations that in many
cases accrued around racialist concepts.) McGregor’s story began with the Scottish
enlightenment model of universal progress as propounded in Australia. In this view, civilization
developed according to stages in economic organisation. Savages hunt, barbarians herd and the
civilized farm and trade. To late eighteenth century observers, Aborigines were savages, but they
were also men and women who had solved in their particular way the universal problem of
happiness. The theory of stadial development may have afforded a benign view at the point of
first contact between colonisers and the colonised, but it failed as a syllabus for colonial tutelage.
When attempts to hurry Aborigines along the supposed stages of civilization failed, the colonisers
doubted the worth and prospects of the Aboriginal race, not the appropriateness of their linear
theory of development.
McGregor is one of two leading scholars on Elkin’s thinking who have centred their
accounts of Elkin between the wars upon the stadial language he used. According to Geoffrey
Gray, ‘Elkin’s discourse on citizenship was premised on a social evolutionary model of society,
and Aboriginal people had to move or be moved along the scale of civilization.’96 Gray has
argued that Elkin’s campaign for citizenship for the Aborigines was an empty shell; Elkin’s
alleged belief that Aborigines ought to live like British Australians was the substance. Gray
argues that the normative force of stadial theory in Elkin’s thinking led him to pursue a policy
where ‘they’ become like ‘us’.97
McGregor’s treatment of the issue was more nuanced. Unlike Gray, McGregor
demonstrated how Elkin gradually distanced himself from the assumption that racial inferiority
set the parameters for Aborigines’ adaptation to the settlers. Indeed, McGregor’s exposition of
Elkin’s thinking after the 1939–45 war disproves Gray’s inflated version of McGregor’s own
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argument about the place of social evolutionism in Elkin’s thinking.98 Yet concerning our period,
the inter-war years, McGregor argues that ‘the evolutionist or progressivist view provided the
basic framework’ for Elkin’s practical work on behalf of Aborigines. McGregor has used Elkin’s
thought up to 1939 as evidence for an argument that only Aborigines’ own spokespeople escaped
the racial thinking that constrained their prospects.
In fact, Elkin used terms from a hybrid of stadial and evolutionary theory, but after about
1925 he never invoked their social evolutionist connotation. Nineteenth-century prejudice, and its
residue in the anthropology of that time, undoubtedly caused Elkin’s choice of the phrase, ‘rise in
the scale of civilization.’ But the question of Aboriginal opportunity to participate in social,
economic and civic life was an unavoidable one. He never entertained the idea that Aborigines
had to learn to farm before they could learn to trade. He insisted that nomadism was an economic
and not a biological practice. As early as 1926, he promoted the achievements of an Aboriginal
mechanic, a mathematician, and a clergyman. Elkin used the terms of stadial theory but his
mature and influential arguments undermined it.
For all that, Elkin’s exposure to racial neuroscience and an associated, purely biological
fatalism did influence his thinking. Elkin took on the mixed messages of Eliot Smith about the
relative importance for cultural attainment of a people’s biology and their environment (Chs. 4
and 5). Until the early 1930s, he remained troubled by neuroscientists and psychologists who
argued that Aborigines were not only less intelligent on average than the settlers, but the
intelligence gap was crucial to civilised living. Such findings were one factor behind his
expectation that Aborigines ‘might not come up to our level.’ In the latter 1920s, he attempted to
build a policy upon this racial science, but by the time he became influential he had already
publicly refuted racialism.
If we are to understand the disposition and purposes that drove effective publicity in the
1930s, then a central question posed by the present state of the historiography of Aboriginal
affairs and Australian anthropology becomes: how and why did Elkin begin to dismantle racialist
thinking? Accordingly, the central turning point of the narrative told in coming chapters comes
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when Elkin decided in 1931 that moral, spiritual, and political arguments must over-ride
scientific evidence in the determination of Aborigines’ capacity to benefit from and contribute to
the settler economy and society (Ch. 8).
VII
From the early 1930s, Elkin’s Anglican milieu delimited his science. Especially from 1921 to
1934, Elkin collaborated with the Reverend Ernest Burgmann (1885-1967) – a seminal
interaction that was literary, pastoral, and pedagogical. Elkin’s participation in the ‘Morpeth
mind’, the intellectual efflorescence centred on St John’s College in Morpeth, (near Newcastle in
New South Wales), and led by Burgmann, is a central strand in his intellectual history.
Burgmann was both mentor and antagonist to Elkin. Burgmann wrote that ‘Man is drawn
by love and driven by fear of suffering’; but, one might add, rarely in equal measure.99 The
antithesis aptly distinguishes Burgmann’s hopeful message from Elkin’s comparatively morbid
preoccupations. Burgmann was the enthusiast for the personality of Christ, and seer of what the
Church could become. Elkin remained zealous in promoting the need for religious practice in the
face of mortality and, in his perception of Aborigines’ predicament, the threat of extinction. In
the early 1930s, their different agendas caused a schism at St John’s College.100 But at the same
time, Burgmann’s influence, and the intellectual opportunities he afforded Elkin, elicited from the
latter a more radical and visionary project. Burgmann helped the priest ascend the path to
prophecy; in so doing, he reminded Elkin of a view of religion that was broader than science
– the vista they each experienced in Francis Anderson’s philosophy class. The impact their
association had on Aboriginal affairs, and Australian anthropology, is here disclosed for the first
time.101
Another influential Anglican associate, the Reverend William Morley, inspired Elkin to
see his social anthropology as fundamentally an instrument for moral progress. An historian has
dissected Elkin’s formal relations with junior anthropologists102; another has studied his rivalry
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with Donald Thomson103; but concerning his close collaboration with his fellow Anglican priest
and co-publicist, Morley, the secondary sources are silent or cursory.104 In documentary and
narrative histories, Morley’s Association for the Protection of Native Races (APNR) has entered
the record only from 1934, when Elkin became its president. Yet, Elkin stood on Morley’s policy
platform, only adjusting its emphasis and adding expertise.
VIII
Elkin’s contribution to Aboriginal affairs can deepen our understanding of the ongoing problems
of land rights, the self-determination of remote communities, and the question of genocide. Our
study of the central themes in Elkin’s intellectual history – faith, Idealism, realism – will, one
trusts, enable a future historian of Aboriginal affairs to illumine these issues that seem so
intractable today. Perhaps our study also offers precedents for reformers’ work in the present.
However, in this thesis we merely lay the groundwork that will equip future historians  to draw
conclusions about Elkin’s influence beyond 1939
Others have been less cautious. Historian of anthropology, Patrick Wolfe, drew a long
bow when he linked four learned articles Radcliffe-Brown published in 1930 with the problems
that, since the 1970s, have beset Native Title claimants in Australia.105 In one sense Wolfe’s
arrow hit its mark: ‘homo superorganicus’ – a caricature of Aborigines as existing, to an
extraordinary degree, in the spiritual and social dimension as distinct from economic and
territorial interests – was indeed propagated in the early 1930s, and has haunted Aboriginal
politics since.106
But historians of anthropology should not follow Wolfe in looking primarily to Radcliffe-
Brown when tracing connections between formative accounts of traditional Aboriginal life and
recent legal and political repercussions. Radcliffe-Brown’s model had only indirect significance
beyond 1930. He left Australia in 1931, never to return and he contributed nothing specific to his
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colleagues’ understanding of Aborigines thereafter. We ought to look instead at Radcliffe-
Brown’s successor as Professor of Anthropology at the University of Sydney, the Reverend
Elkin.
In addition to championing culture over race as a paradigm for understanding Aborigines’
interaction with settler society, Elkin also recommended culture and not territory as the primary
focus for reformers’ and Aborigines’ efforts. Elkin proposed that Aborigines should pursue rights
in land primarily to shore up their lines of religious continuity, and not in an attempt to maintain
the traditional socio-economic structures associated with subsistence living (Chs. 6, 9). In thus
emphasising spiritual priorities over political goals, Elkin perpetuated a long-standing reform
tradition, Christian Socialism; and developed a central theme of social anthropologists since
William Robertson Smith (Chs. 3, 9).
Elkin deliberately contained Australian social anthropology within parameters set by the
spiritual dimension to Aboriginal life. His re-invention of ‘homo superorganicus’ outlasted the
demise of Radcliffe-Brown’s structuralism; and did much to define the general public’s
understanding of traditional Aboriginal life. Elkin propagated a consistent, precise, and
systematic account of Aborigines, carrying the authority of science. But he built this account
upon a moral imperative, inspired by a religious vision; and only thence a political strategy.
Heather Goodall has illustrated the injustice and failures in land policy with which Elkin was
associated. She has shown how Elkin’s views of particular Indigenous people’s claims to land
arose from his preoccupation with issues of culture and psychology, rather than the practical
sense of justice that might not have tolerated the repeated acts of dispossession that occurred in
northern New South Wales.107 We will provide the intellectual context that explains some of the
origins of Elkin’s ambivalent attitude towards Aborigines’ relations with territory (Chs 1, 3, 6,
and 9).
In accepting but seeking to ameliorate dispossession, Elkin believed himself to be
pursuing a realistic Idealist project. He agreed with Robertson Smith’s theory that the communal
property regime typical of pre-literate societies was conducive to a ‘natural religion’ (Ch. 3); but
he also believed that an individualised property regime supported basic human rights, especially
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for women ((Ch. 6); and that Aborigines’ societies would need to have the option of treating land
as capital, rather than being bound into an inalienable relation to territory (Ch. 9).
Elkin is also associated with the problem of child removal in the administration of
Aboriginal communities. Following the Bringing Them Home report in 1997, child removal has
attracted the attention of genocide scholars.108 They have found that genocidal policy gave way
quite suddenly after 1939 to, arguably, specifically anti-genocidal policies. No figure is more
important than Elkin in that transition. As we will see, it was Elkin’s acculturative agenda that
first broke the stranglehold of eliminationist ideas in settler Australia. As others have shown,
Elkin’s ongoing advocacy of acculturative assimilation provided academic authority for
Aborigines’ struggle to unwind an enculturative national assimilation program.109
A. Dirk Moses has written that settler Australians have had ‘incommensurable responses’
to genocidal elements in their history and ongoing national project.110 ‘Humanitarians’ have
recognised and sought to mitigate Aborigines’ dispossession and devastation; ‘triumphalists’
trumpeted the liberal ideals that they believed justified settlement.
Advocates of assimilation attempted to reconcile these two perspectives. The dominant
figures in each of the main streams of assimilation – Hasluck and Elkin – were clearly
humanitarian, but each also had one foot firmly in the triumphalist camp. Hasluck saw as
inevitable the attenuation of Aboriginal culture to something merely private.  He wrote that
Aborigines were fortunate that the British settled their land and he expressly aimed to assist
Aboriginal individuals and families to abandon Aboriginal ways of life to the extent that those
ways of life marked off Aborigines as groups apart from mainstream Australia.111  As van
Krieken has argued, Hasluck expressed an ‘ethnocidal’ tendency in individualistic liberal
governance.
Elkin’s attempt to balance humanitarianism with nationalism was more ambivalent.  Elkin
believed that the individual freedoms and the global intercourse that settler Australian society
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afforded Aborigines might justify the invasion of the continent – but only if Aboriginal group life
was supported such that Indigenous peoples were able collectively and publicly, as well as
individually and privately, to reconcile with settler Australia.  Elkin’s achievement was to see
beyond a broadly ethnocidal situation (in which settler-colonial imperatives shaped science,
religion and governance) and champion a countervailing set of universalist and culturally liberal
(pluralist or at least anti-homogeneous) beliefs, practices, and institutional norms. The following
chapters study Elkin’s religious journey, and the practical questions about Aboriginal affairs into
which it led him. What we will find might suggest that future historians of genocide,
anthropology, Aboriginal affairs, and Australian liberalism would do well to consider the relation
between faith and reason – especially where incommensurable values might seem to doom
opposing sides in a political conflict to permanent enmity.112 Elkin, who in leading a reform
movement tolerated political ambivalence, perceived himself to be working in support of both
Aborigines’ cultural persistence and the Australian nation.
Looking ahead
As stated, the primary focus of this thesis is not the consequences of Elkin’s work. Rather our
focus and original contribution will follow from our attempt to answer the question, how did he
come to pursue his ambitious goal at all? What influences and principles enabled him to
transcend his own involvement in the settler Australian arrogance and fatalism regarding
Aborigines, and his structurally typical oscillation in the 1920s between culturally preservationist
segregation and culturally eliminationist modes of assimilation? The first seven of the nine
following chapters provide an answer to this question. Only in the final two chapters do we turn
to the ways in which Elkin led Australian opinion to an assimilationist consensus. Thus our
ultimate question becomes: how did Elkin come to lead settler Australian society towards a
policy of assimilation of Aborigines, and how did he attempt to impregnate this assimilationist
consensus with his preferred but in 1930 ‘seemingly utopian’ acculturative project?113
Our study proceeds in three parts. In Part One, we study Elkin’s spiritual and intellectual
formation in Christian Idealism in order to understand the sources and the originality of his
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policy position. In Part Two, we see how religious and Idealist concerns imbricated with his
scientific training and early involvement in questions of policy. In Part Three, we observe how
these concerns found clearer form from 1930, and shaped Elkin’s rise to eminence as a publicist
and a scientist.
The three parts are organised thematically; themes also develop through linkages that
span the narrative. The Idealist publicity explored in Chapter One has strong echoes in our
account in Chapter Eight of Elkin’s famous and seminal publicity in the early to mid-1930s. Less
familiar are the chapters on Elkin’s religious quest and its effect on his scholarship and
reformism: Chapter Seven studies the resolution of the personal spiritual problems studied in
Chapters Two and Three; and Chapter Six sets out some institutional and scholarly avenues
through which Elkin satisfied the public dimension of these problems. Chapters Seven and Nine
contain parallel accounts of the arguments by which Elkin consolidated his preference for a
diffusionist historical functionalism over a structuralist functionalism: the former from a personal
and pastoral point of view, the latter through a study of key articles in Oceania, the journal of the
Department of Anthropology at the University of Sydney.
That said, the main organising principle in this thesis is that each chapter works as a self-
contained essay, in which we study interacting influences upon Elkin. I have given each of these
thematic explorations structural precedence, rather than sacrificing complexity to the demands of
a linear narrative. This means that some material recurs in different contexts. The first three
chapters, which set out the formative inter-relation in Elkin’s thinking of scholarly Idealism,
religious commitment, and the emergence of social anthropology from social psychology, focus
respectively on 1912–1915, then c. 1900–1921; then 1916 to 1921, developing different
perspectives upon overlapping subject matter.
Similarly, each of Chapters Four to Six explores a theme (realism, Idealism, and Christian
mission, respectively) in the lead-up to Elkin’s impasse of 1929, and so each offers a different
perspective upon his thinking in that year. W. H. R. Rivers’ arguments about the ‘psychological
factor’ are an important part of Elkin’s experience of diffusionism (Ch. 4); they recur in
connection with Elkin’s attitude to Anglican mission and its centrality for broader, secular lines
of his policy development (Ch. 6). Rivers’ arguments provided Elkin with the conceptual frame
for his series of five articles he published in Burgmann’s Morpeth Review in 1929–1930, ‘The
Practical Value of Anthropology’.
Anchorage in Aboriginal Affairs:
A.P. Elkin on religious continuity and civic obligation
42
Our contextualisation and analysis of the ‘Practical Value of Anthropology’ series is the
wide centre of this thesis, set out in Chapter Four and elaborated in Chapters Five and Six. The
importance of the series consists in the fact that Elkin wrote it as a problem poser; in all his
subsequent writings, he positioned himself as a problem solver. In 1929, he candidly laid out the
full range of problems – racial, structural-functional, and psychological – he considered relevant
to culture contact in Australia; afterwards, he strategically delimited the perspectives and data
that he believed would lead to the best results for Aborigines and for settler Australia. The
‘Practical Value’ series is our key text for understanding what Elkin himself thought, as against
what he decided he and others ought to think.
The series is also central because it reveals the conflict between racial science on the one
hand and a combination of Idealism, psychology, and religious commitment on the other. In
1929, Elkin wrote as a realist publicist compromised, even paralysed, by an Idealist position he
had not yet integrated with his desire to advance as a professional scientist. We have to
understand the impasse of 1929 before we can appreciate the way he broke through it in 1931.
As mentioned earlier, our account of Elkin’s seminal influence upon practical affairs
begins in Chapter Eight, in which the year 1931 is presented as a baseline for Elkin’s national (as
against Church-based) acculturative agenda. The southern Autumn of 1931, with which Chapter
Eight begins, serves as our climax: then, Elkin rejected the option of biological absorption,
determined upon a morally engaged and politically strategic mode of anthropology, and began to
propagate his duty-oriented publicity. Chapter Eight goes on to show how the Christian Idealism
influenced Elkin’s most influential years as a reformer-publicist; Chapter Nine, how religious,
moral and political concerns, interacting with an increasing knowledge of contact situations,
shaped Elkin’s (and the dominant Australian) school of social anthropology.
Elkin’s story does not provide any new conclusions that are of immediate usefulness to
contemporary Aboriginal affairs. It may illustrate the continued pertinence of some old insights,
and illumine some complex ongoing problems. Most of all, I trust that our study will disclose the
questions, interests, and commitments that enabled and drove forward arguably the most
significant Australian advance towards a practicable agenda for the interaction of settler
Australian and Indigenous cultures.  In particular, the following chapters show how the Christian
Idealist milieu – spanning a range of agnostic and liberal responses to Christian traditions, and in
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competition with medical, administrative and more strictly academic knowledge groups –
produced a morally integrated policy framework for Aboriginal affairs.
